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STATES OF BEING
Response Piece
Martha Albertson Fineman
I thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to engage with the important ideas
presented in Professor Huntington’s Article “Familial Norms and
Normality.”1 I hope that my comments accurately capture her major points
and reflect the importance of the topics she addresses. My comments are made
in the spirit of engaged academic exchange and seek not only to take her
Article seriously, but also to encourage her to expand and develop further the
significant concepts with which she is working.
INTRODUCTION
Professor Huntington grounds her Article on the assertion that emotion
generally plays a critical role in shaping both formal law and social norms.
She asserts that the impact of emotion on social norms—a relationship that is
both under-explored and under-theorized in legal scholarship—is most
significant when it comes to regulation of the family. She presents the
centrality of social norms to the family as “indirect” regulation, in contrast to
formal, legal arrangements. While many commentators recognize that social
norms are part of the regulatory mechanism for the family, Professor
Huntington observes that few have addressed the significant role of the state in
both the manipulation and the generation of the emotions that comprise,
inform, and shape those norms. That is, the state not only creates law, but it
also generates and harnesses emotion to construct social norms. In particular,
Professor Huntington concludes that two contemporary approaches to social
norms—rational-choice theory and law-and-society scholarship—have failed
to adequately take into account the role of emotion in the formulation of social
norms. This is the task that she sets for herself in the Article, with the
objective of showing how understanding and employing the relationship
between emotion and social norms may lead to more positive and pluralistic
regulation of the family by the state. To that end, she urges that in addition to

 Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Director of Feminism and Legal Theory Project, Emory
University School of Law.
1 Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, 59 EMORY L.J. 1103 (2010) (Article).
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laws, social norms should be explicitly and transparently cultivated and
promoted by the state through subtle “norm entrepreneurship.”2
Professor Huntington’s exploration of the potentially positive role for
emotion and social norms in rethinking the place of the state in family
regulation is an important contribution to the field. In calling for a more
realistic approach to the variety and range of family emotions, she persuasively
argues there is a need for widespread reexamination of the assumptions and
beliefs (and emotions) informing social norms governing the family. In
positing an active role for the state beyond formal law, she correctly positions
the state as involved\ in the actual construction and imposition of informal,
extra-legal modes of regulation, thus making the case for state responsibility in
both the reexamination and reformulation of social norms.
However, in order to accomplish the ambitious tasks she sets out for
herself, I suggest that she should give more attention to clarifying the meaning
of key concepts. Elaboration of certain assertions and terms would strengthen
her observations and arguments, making both more persuasive. In the
following Parts, I raise some key issues and questions regarding the concepts
and terms that warrant further development and articulation.
I. THE STATE
At a basic and very preliminary level, Professor Huntington should supply
the reader with her vision of “the state.” As envisioned in her Article, the state
seems rather monolithic and omnipotent. Its capabilities and processes are
described in anthropomorphic terms in that the state is seen as acting as the
result of some unitary motive or to achieve a well-defined objective.3
A. The Fragmented State
Whatever else it may be, the state is not a monolithic entity; nor is there
only one state with which to be concerned. When it comes to family and
intimacy issues in particular, the state should be seen as fragmented and
multiple in form, with various components that are often duplicative and
frequently in contention with one another. On the most obvious level, there are
multiple states involved with families and family laws. In governance or law
making, we have a federalist system—a national government coexistent with
2
3

Id. at Part III.A (examining emotion and state norm entrepreneurship).
Id. at 1105.
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multiple state entities. These overlapping sources of potential family
regulation are complimented and complicated by local and regional authorities
that also can adopt policy and rules (and certainly can influence understandings
of social norms and emotions).
But even considered independently and individually, these multiple
manifestations of the state are not free to act unencumbered. They are
composed of various bodies that are supposed to “check” and “balance” the
process of governance.4 Legislatures, courts, and executives are governed (or
regulated) by myriad rules, conventions, constitutional mandates, and
geographical and ideological constraints. Some of these are externally
imposed, but many are processed internally—interpreted and implemented by
the various departments, agencies, officials, bureaucracies, and other entities
that may make up any individual state. This is the “separation of powers”
point, but it also reflects the reality that any individual state is really a variety
of complementary, overlapping, dynamic, contingent, and interactive
segments.
Further, it seems obvious to me that it is the individuals within these sets of
institutional arrangements who act as or for the state. This raises additional
questions about how one determines which actions and motivations can be
attributed to “the state” and which actions or motivations are more properly
attributed to those who populate (however temporarily) its law-making
structures. When acting in their capacity as state officials, individuals are
constrained by various factors, including laws and processes as noted above,
but individual characteristics and contexts also influence individual behavior.
In understanding how and why these individuals act within their official
governmental positions, we might have to also consider their political position,
ambition, and prospects for reelection or reappointment. We could also factor
in an individual’s ideology, personal relationships, native ability, biases, and so
on.5 My question is whether the individuality and particularity of beliefs,
politics, and contexts influencing those individuals who act for the state

4 A modern state is made up of various components, typically including a legislative body, an executive,
a judiciary, and various agencies and commissions.
5 Another way to make this point is to ask if social norms actually inform and constrain how individuals
acting in a state capacity behave. Might social (and professional) norms independently affect how these actors
participate in the construction and manipulation of social norms in attempts to regulate the family?
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undermines the idea that the state can be conceptualized as acting to
accomplish a singular goal or objective.6
B. The State as Actor and Agent
Professor Huntington’s analysis would also benefit greatly from specific
articulation of her understanding of the process by which the state as an actor
or agent uses emotions for the creation and maintenance of social norms. This
raises more than simply the “who” question identified in the preceding section;
it also raises very important “how” and “why” questions—that is, how exactly
does the state act and how can we determine state purpose or motivation with
any specificity. I think these types of inquiry fatally complicate the idea of
single-purpose state action.
Professor Huntington seems to view the state as acting as an entity. For
example, she posits that the state can through its actions, by sending particular
messages, change the “emotional context of intimate and personal decision
making.”7 This seems to view the state as capable of acting (successfully and
forcefully) as a single unified unit. One page of the Article presents the state
as regulating, influencing, affecting, using, creating, and manipulating either
emotions and social norms or families themselves.8 In the section discussing
the state as a norm entrepreneur, we are told that there is a possibility of the
state “actively shaping ground-level social norms by changing the emotional
content of decision making.”9 In the sections on “What the State Does” and
“How the State Does It,” the ability to choose to further a value, to act in a
covert manner potentially subverting the democratic process, to send hidden
messages, and to use emotion as a tool are all attributed to the state.10
6 When we think of states and the authority of law or norms, we also should include many of the quasipublic institutions that intersect with formal states and act under the authority of law. In other words, the state
can also be manifested through complex institutional arrangements that don’t have the imprimatur of formal
government but can powerfully affect norms. Such entities also are state actors in that state acts brought them
into legally recognized existence, and they often operate under particular state mandates or regulatory regimes.
In fact, Nancy Cott has argued that the state actually constitutes itself through the legal recognition and
subsequent regulation of societal institutions like the family. See Nancy F. Cott, Giving Character to Our
Whole Civil Polity: Marriage and the Public Order in Late Nineteenth Century, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN’S
HISTORY 107 (L.K. Kerber, A. Kessler-Harris & K.K. Sklar eds., 1995) (giving a historian’s perspective on the
family as an institution). Professor Cott states that “one might go so far as to say the institution of marriage
and the modern state have been mutually constitutive” and further that “one of the principal means that the
state can use to prove its existence . . . is its authority over marriage.” Id. at 109.
7 Huntington, supra note 1, at 1103.
8 Id. at 1107.
9 Id. at 1154.
10 Id. at 1154–56.
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One example from Professor Huntington’s Article is illustrative of why I
find it problematic to talk about actions such as manipulation of emotions or
construction of social norms as undertaken by “the state.” She asserts that
there are some political actors who use “proxy fights” in seeking to influence
women considering an abortion.11 The fights she discusses are those creating
“indirect barriers to abortion,” such as requiring a woman to view a sonogram
of the fetus before being given access to an abortion.12 “The goal is to create a
norm that stigmatizes abortion . . . . seeking to impose, cultivate, or evoke the
emotions of motherhood in all pregnant women.” 13 According to Professor
Huntington, a further example of measures that “play a particular role in the
‘culture of life’”14 are the infant safe haven laws that, while “facially
unobjectionable,” have as their “deeper meaning . . . pro-life social norm
entrepreneurship . . . seek[ing] to change the emotional resonance of the
abortion decision.”15 Recognizing that abortion is an event that may have
emotional resonance without state contribution, Professor Huntington
concludes nonetheless that “the state is privileging and emphasizing one set of
emotions[,] . . . . manipulating the emotional context of decision making.”16
We are not told who or what acts as the state in this context or how in so acting
state’s purpose is revealed in this analysis, perhaps because the answers are
supposed to be obvious.
But when the state acts, it does so through a complex set of institutional
relationships and actions; it is hardly a monolithic entity moving forward with
one mind or urged on by one motivation. Passing a law or explicitly stating
policy in a legislative debate is a more transparent and public activity than
norm creation or the manipulation of emotion, and therefore these activities are
more open to analysis and critique. However, the legislative process requires a
variety of actions on the part of the state: study, investigation, fact finding, and
11

Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1134. She also includes “extra-legal efforts,” such as claims that women later regret abortions,
as an example of the creation of a culture of life. Id. at 1134. These are viewed as attempts to “shape an antiabortion social norm by changing the individual and cultural dimension of the emotions associated with
abortion.” Id. at 1134.
13 Id. at 1134. A page later, Huntington’s Article reveals that a woman may sign a waiver and decline to
view the ultrasound. Id. at 1135. Such a legislative escape route suggests that the state may have been of at
least two minds on the sonogram issue. Rather than “choos[ing] this method because it is so effective at
conveying the state’s preferred narrative,” id. at 1135, perhaps the norm of individual choice just bumped the
norm of fully informed decision making, confusing the state.
14 Id. at 1134 (quoting Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 753, 753 (2006)).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1136.
12
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negotiation involving legislators and, their staffs, as well as others such as
experts and interest groups who are brought into the process. Legislating also
involves agencies and other mechanisms of executive power with
implementation authority, as well as the judiciary, which has a key role in
resolving disputes. Which acts count as state acts, particularly when there is
some inconsistency or disagreement among these actors? Do we only look at
the last act (assuming there is one)? Or do we perhaps look just at final
legislation, leaving aside negotiation, compromise, and reconciliation within
the legislature as well as subsequent executive enforcement or judicial review?
It seems to me that the idea of a monolithic state is even more incoherent
when we consider attributing attitudes, objectives, or motivation to a single
thing called “the state.” Professor Huntington should address how a complex
entity like the state arrives at a single objective, or even a set of objectives, on
an issue like abortion or other similarly highly contested policy matters. In
addition, I am unsure of how we can determine with any certainty the
definitive motivations for specific legislation. Further, what is the significance
of inconsistent or contested positions in determining state objectives or
motivation? An advocate of infant safe haven laws might genuinely want to
save newborns from abandonment, quite independent of his or her position on
the right of a woman’s choice when it comes to abortion. Is it correct to ignore
that motivation or to consider it trumped for purposes of academic criticism
just because another (devious pro-life) legislator really wants to stigmatize
abortion in any way possible? Which desires, objectives, and motivations of
which state actors should count?
II. SOCIAL NORMS AND EMOTION
A second welcome set of clarifications and amplifications would center on
Professor Huntington’s use of the terms “social norms” and “emotions.” Both
are employed in various, sometimes confusing, way that incorporate both
“hard” and “soft” meanings for each term.17 From a theoretical perspective, I
prefer to work with the harder versions, but I recognize that perhaps only the
softer manifestations allow Professor Huntington to make her boldest claims.

17 I use “hard” to denote concise, clear, defined terms or categories. “Soft,” by contrast, indicates
blurred, ambiguous, or shifting categories.
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A. Social Norms
Professor Huntington sets out the very broad proposition that social norms
are “the rules of behavior that individuals follow despite the absence of legal
obligation or formal penalty for noncompliance.”18 In talking about non-legal
systems of behavioral regulation, the interesting question arises as to why
individuals would comply with social norms, particularly if compliance is
against their preferences or values or even merely inconvenient. Law carries
with it the prospect of formal sanction and coercion or incorporates incentives
and subsidies, but what equivalent enticements are inherent in social norms?
Professor Huntington observes that the idea underlying social norms theory
is that such norms influence people because individuals are social beings who
are attentive to others’ views, seek approval, and alter their behavior to avoid
disapproval. However, she does not seem to sufficiently contemplate this
question of the relationship between social norms and sanctions. Certainly
there must be some relationship. If the sanction is slight, incidental, or
insignificant, an individual may well ignore the norm. Absent some
significant, clearly evident sanction, perceived self-interest may trump any
specific social norm. In fact, if the sanction is uncommunicated, minimal, or
insignificant, there may even be a question as to whether something should be
labeled a social norm at all.
Debates about how social norms should be understood and classified have
persisted for over a century.19 Social proscriptions and prescriptions grouped
under the category of social norms clearly exist along a variety of spectrums.
They can be classified according to characteristics like formality or severity of
sanction, specificity or explicitness in the statement of the norm, source[s] of
authority, socialization process whereby the norm is transmitted (family,
school, or media), or patterns of deviance from the norm, to name just a few.
Particularly relevant to the notion that norms can influence behavior (and thus
have the predictive possibilities Professor Huntington desires) would seem to

18

Huntington, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1105.
See WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMMER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF
USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES AND MORALS 34–43 (1906) (proposing classification of norms into
folkways and mores); see also PITIRIM A. SOROKIN, SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY: THEIR
STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS 87 (1969) (criticizing Summer and developing a more focused classification
scheme including law norms, technical norms, and norms of etiquette and fashion along with more amorphous
norms).
19
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be the longstanding distinction between what have historically been labeled
“absolute” and “conditional” norms.20
More than fifty years ago, Richard Morris explained the differences
between these poles of norm classification by characterizing an absolute norm
as one “which is known and supported by everyone, which applies to
everybody under all conditions, which is rigorously enforced by heavy
sanctions.”21 By contrast, conditional norms are of limited application and
sporadic enforcement.22 Examining this distinction suggests points of inquiry
that further complicate the notion of a predictable causal line between social
norms and human behavior.
Is a social norm clearly universally applicable, or is it merely one of several
acceptable or contested alternatives? And if it is an alternative, is there a
hierarchy of norms? Is there any interpretive flexibility in the articulation of
the social norm, or is it specific and detailed? Ultimately, what is the context
for enforcement, particularly, what extent and degree of power does the
enforcement community exerts over the individual? In regard to this last
inquiry, it would seem to make a significant difference if the non-legal
sanction were nothing more than a shake of the head with a “tsk-tsk”—
especially when compared to excommunication from a religious body with
which the individual shares a fundamental belief about the terms of salvation.
I wonder how each of the situations set forth in the Introduction to Professor
Huntington’s Article should be sorted using such classification possibilities23:
A young boy hits his brother in a crowded subway.
A young woman and man are trying to decide whether to marry,
move in together, or remain in separate homes.
A thirty-nine-year-old single woman considers using donated sperm
to become pregnant and raise a child on her own.
A gay couple puzzles through who should attend the Mother’s Day
celebration at their children’s school.
A mother contemplates breastfeeding her baby in a crowded public
park.

20

Or, in my terms, hard and soft norms.
Richard T. Morris, A Typology of Norms, 21 AM. SOC. REV. 610, 612 (1956). Under this definition,
there are at least three stages: generation and acceptance, universal application, and implementation through
sanctions. Norms that complement or supplement legal rules may also be deemed absolute, and the law or
legal institutions may play a role in assisting the transmission and acceptance of norms and non-legal
sanctions.
22 Id.
23 The following list of situations is set forth in paragraph format in Huntington, supra note 1.
21
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A teenager considers having sex with his girlfriend.
A closeted lesbian ponders bringing her partner to the annual holiday
party.
A visibly pregnant woman decides whether to order a glass of wine
in a restaurant.
A woman considers terminating her pregnancy.
A family thinks seriously about homeschooling their young children.

Is a young couple’s decision to marry, cohabitate, or remain in separate
homes—with all of the concrete benefits that may flow from that decision (tax
incentives, health and welfare benefits, and formal legal entitlements)—really
motivated by the same type of norm processing as a parent’s reaction to a
young boy’s choice to hit his brother in a subway? Is a single, thirty-nineyear-old woman’s decision to become pregnant using donated sperm really
governed by the same social norm calculus as an individual teenager’s decision
to have sex with his girlfriend? Professor Huntington’s assertion that all these
situations fall under the broad classification of “social norms” seems in need of
further refinement.
As I indicated earlier, I prefer a harder version (meaning more universal,
specific, heavily sanctioned, or absolute) of the concept of social norms. If the
concept is too loosely theorized, it loses all analytic and predictive force. This
is not to say that there may be some social conventions or customs with
normative implications (but lacking strong sanctions) or personal values24 that
come into play in these situations. However, I question whether in twentyfirst-century America most, if any, of the above situations are governed by
anything that could be considered close to an absolute norm—in the sense that
it is coherent, clearly dominant, and works to predict individual behavior on a
wide scale. This point is more than a quibble with the situations selected; it is
the assertion that if the enforcement community is too small or localized and
unique, the concept is trivialized by labeling it as a social norm.25 A more
acceptable characterization would be to say that within these given contexts
(such as the workplace of the closeted lesbian or the family of the woman

24 Professor Huntington does not address the relationship between values and norms in her Article. One
distinction is that norms require a community and consensus, while values are held individually and may
overlap, or be coexistent with, or reflective of, social norms. Since they are internalized on an individual level,
values can even be in opposition to social norms and may be a more potent influence on and predictor of
individual behavior.
25 The smaller and more unique the community of enforcement, the more successfully the individual can
escape to the moral security of other normative orders or hide their “deviation” from surveillance and
response.
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considering abortion) there might be constraints or expectations (norms and
sanctions associated with those specific communities) that could structure
individual decision making.
B. Emotions
I also have some difficulty understanding of what is encompassed within
Professor Huntington’s concept of “emotion.” The category seems very elastic
and over-inclusive.
This over-inclusiveness is evident in Professor
Huntington’s description of emotions26 and in her analysis of the roles of
emotion.27 Descriptively, emotion is articulated through a series of examples,
rather than a conceptual definition. As a human phenomenon, Professor
Huntington asserts that “emotion” may be the individual disgust felt by an
opponent of gay marriage toward a lesbian couple or the collective opinion of
groups mobilized to promote child welfare.28 In the first example, emotion is a
feeling, but in the second it is an opinion or belief. In the former, emotion is
individual, but in the latter it is collective. Describing emotion using such
divergent examples makes it very difficult for the reader to deduce a cogent
theory or definition.
Professor Huntington repeatedly describes emotion as “integral to family
life,”29 “interwoven into every aspect of our lives,”30 “at the center of the
[same sex marriage] debate,”31 “the currency that enforces parenting social
norms,”32 and a “key component of reason.”33 Each of these characterizations
emphasizes the significance of emotion without actually defining it. By virtue
of its ubiquity, emotion seems not only to permeate nearly everything but to
include it as well. Is it really emotion that serves as both the content of, and a
compliance factor for, a norm? Are there other factors beyond emotion, such
as formal legal structures, individual behavior, institutional arrangements, or
material circumstances, that further affect the viability of a norm? A narrower
definition of emotion would provide for a more precise analytical framework
equipped to confront such questions.

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Huntington, supra note 1, at 1105.
Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1120.
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Professor Huntington falls into a similar pattern of unduly elastic
boundaries in her analysis of the roles of emotion. She presents four categories
for the roles of emotion vis-à-vis social norms: “emotion as the content of a
norm,” “emotion as the instigator of a norm,” “emotion as a compliance
factor,” and “emotion as a complicating factor.”34 By rendering emotion the
content, the catalyst, the regulator, and the complicater of norms, she equates
emotion with a series of different psycho-social phenomena. Does Professor
Huntington really mean that emotion is all of these things? If so, what is the
purpose of addressing social norms if emotion essentially eclipses them? A
more precise definition of emotion would better clarify the real value of this
theory to the law and the state.
III. IN SEARCH OF THE SAVANNAH
Professor Huntington has presented us with a forceful account of why
understanding emotion is essential to understanding how social norms—and
thus family law regulation—work. The important and ultimate purpose of this
project is to facilitate the development of more creative and effective state
interventions in family life. I share with Professor Huntington the ambition of
imagining a more effective and responsive state when it comes to family
policy. There is a need for the state, however conceived, to be more
responsive to the realities of individuals and families. By engaging with the
concepts of emotion and social norms, as well as interrogating the role of the
state in regulation of the family through informal means, Professor Huntington
has raised some intriguing avenues for further exploration.
In concluding her Article, Professor Huntington concedes that her efforts to
examine the role of emotion in family law (and family norms) have not
presented an exact theory that finds “a savannah between the desert of rationalchoice accounts and the swamp of law-and-society accounts.”35 I hope my
comments will provide some small footholds or guideposts as she pushes
toward further development of such a theory.

34
35

Id. at 1147–48.
Id. at 1150.

